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1 Introduction
Recently, there has been a great deal of research into the demand for redistribution and
its determinants. However, this research focuses on preferences for the total amount of
redistribution and its economic, institutional, and behavioral determinants while neglecting
preferences for the composition of the redistributive budget. Some recent examples are
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), Alesina and Giuliano (2009), and Neustadt and Zweifel
(2009). One notable exception is a study by Boeri et al. (2002) based on Contingent
Valuation (CV) experiments. However, there is a weakness to the CV approach in that it
holds all the attributes of the good in question constant, varying its price only. This is not
descriptive of actual decision making where other attributes almost always vary along with
price; moreover, it invites strategic responses because respondents can focus on a single
attribute. In this paper, other attributes of importance will be shown to be the uses of the
money available for redistribution (health, old age, etc.) and the type of beneficiary (e.g.
foreigner, national).
In contrast to CV, the methodology of Discrete Choice Experiments (DCE) used in
this study allows the creation of realistic decision-making scenarios by making respondents
choose between alternatives where all attributes vary, among them, price. The two main
findings are that there is willingness to pay (WTP) for redistribution favoring families with
children to the detriment of all other uses and favoring Swiss nationals to the detriment of
foreigners.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a literature
review from which hypotheses to be tested are derived. The first set of hypotheses concerns
the different uses of the redistribution budget and the second set, the nationality of the
potential beneficiaries. Section 3 presents a general description of the method of DCEs as
well as the design of the present experiment. The descriptive statistics of the experiment
follow in Section 4, and hypothesis tests, in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes the results
and concludes with implications for public policy.
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2 Literature Review and Statement of Hypotheses
This section first presents research that defines the general background of this paper and
then moves on to contributions that lead to a set of specific hypotheses to be tested.
2.1 General Determinants of the Demand for Income Redistri-
bution
In their reviews, Alesina and Giuliano (2009) and Akkoyunlu et al. (2009) identify a wide set
of factors influencing preferences for public income redistribution that can be categorized
as economic, political, and behavioral determinants. As to the economic determinants,
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) empirically analyzed the effects of current and future in-
come on the demand for redistribution in the United States. While low current income
bolsters demand, chances for higher future income reduce it provided the tax system is
progressive. As suggested by the social contract literature, citizens’ preferences for redis-
tribution can also be interpreted as preferences for insurance by risk-averse individuals [cf.
Rawls (1999)]. In a hypothetical situation, where individuals do not yet know their endow-
ment nor their future position in society (‘veil of ignorance’), demand for redistribution
is predicted because it provides an income transfer from more favorable future states to
less favorable ones. Beck (1994) investigates individual behavior under the ’veil of igno-
rance’ in an experiment. Using lotteries to represent a hypothetical society with random
differences in individual incomes, he analyzes the amount of desired income redistribution.
Individuals indeed display risk aversion, albeit not of the extreme kind as implied by the
Rawlsian maximin rule. Furthermore, their preference for income redistribution does not
exceed the level that can be explained by individual risk aversion. This result provides a
foundation for our Hypotheses 2 to 4 in Section 2.2.
As to the political determinants, the literature [Persson and Tabellini (2000, 2003);
Lizzeri and Persico (2001); Milesi-Ferretti et al. Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002)] predicts that
proportional representation causes a tendency towards universal programs benefitting var-
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ious groups (old-age pensioners, working poor, minorities, etc.), while majority rule results
in targeted ”pork barrel” programs. Persson and Tabellini (2003) find supporting empiri-
cal evidence in that countries with proportional representation have a share of government
expenditure in GDP that ceteris paribus is 5 percentage points higher than with major-
ity rule. Moreover, according to Akkoyunlu et al. (2009) there are signs of a positive
correlation between the degree of proportional representation and the share of transfers
in GDP among OECD countries. Further political determinants of redistribution include
two-party vs. multiparty system, presidential vs. parliamentary democracy, and direct vs.
representative democracy, with two-party systems, presidential, and direct democracies all
predicted to induce less public redistribution.
Among the behavioral determinants of income redistribution, beliefs have been at the
center of attention. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) develop a model where society’s belief
whether effort or luck determines economic success is responsible for multiple self-fulfilling
equilibria while Benabou and Tirole (2006) propose a model for the emergence and per-
sistence of such collective beliefs. On the empirical side, Fong (2001) presents evidence
in line with Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) suggesting that beliefs about the role of luck
in determining economic success are an important explanatory variable in the demand for
redistribution. Their importance could be conditioned by a concern for incentives. If effort
determines income, then an increased income tax rate for financing redistribution causes a
loss of output due to weakened work incentives. However, Fong (2001) finds that such con-
cerns do not modify the link between beliefs and the demand for redistribution. Using fiscal
data, Corneo and Fong (2008) estimate willingness to pay for distributive justice and show
that, in the United States, the monetary value of justice on average amounts to about
one-fifth of the disposable household income. However, there exists marked preference
heterogeneity between racial and income groups.
Boeri et al. (2001) study attitudes towards redistribution with a focus on pension and
unemployment schemes in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, using CV experiments that
impose an explicit trade-off between income and social insurance coverage on respondents.
They find opposition against an extension of the welfare state, with conflicts between young
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and old, rich and poor, and insiders and outsiders creating significant hurdles to welfare
reform.
Neustadt and Zweifel (2009, 2010) elicit preferences for the total volume of income
redistribution. According to a specification relating choices to the attributes of redistri-
bution without socioeconomic covariates, the average Swiss citizen would have to be be
paid a compensation of CHF 11.78 (some US$ 12) per month (0.72 percent of monthly
income) for an additional percentage point of GDP devoted to public redistribution. In
addition, a very marked status quo bias would have to be overcome by payment of another
5.27 percent of monthly income. Willingness to pay (WTP) for redistribution is estimated
to be maximum at 21 rather than the current 25 percent of GDP. Furthermore, Neustadt
and Zweifel (2009) test several hypotheses concerning the effects of economic well-being
on the demand for redistribution without any confounding supply-side influences. WTP
for redistribution is shown to increase with income and education, contradicting the stan-
dard economic model [Romer (1975), Roberts (1977), Meltzer and Richard (1981)]. The
Prospect of Upward Mobility hypothesis [Hirschman and Rothschild (1973), Benabou and
Ok (2001)] receives very partial empirical support. Finally, Neustadt (2011, forthcoming)
studies preference heterogeneity with respect to cultural and religious beliefs, confirming
the negative relationship between the degree of religiosity and WTP for redistribution.
2.2 Types of Beneficiaries and Preferences for Redistribution
In this paper, we elicit preferences for different compositions of the redistribution portfolio,
i.e. the slicing of the total redistribution pie. First, we consider the following five types of
transfer recipients: old-age pensioners, people in ill health, the unemployed, working poor,
and families with children. In view of the insurance motivation for redistribution proposed
by Beck (1994), the ordering of the risks confronting an individual is of crucial importance.
In Switzerland, the ‘risk’ of living up to retirement age (65 for men, 63 for women) is 85
percent for a 20 year old male and 97 percent for a 20 year old female, respectively [?].
However, this risk is highly insured because mandatory public and employment-related
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provision together guarantee about 60 percent of pre-retirement income. The highest
uninsured risk is to be in a household with children; it amounts to 33 percent as of 2000
[?]. Information on the working poor (another uninsured risk) is not available; however,
for persons with no education beyond minimum schooling, the share of houselholds with
incomes below the poverty level (defined as 60 percent of the median adjusted for household
size) is 29 percent [?]. A recent survey found that 28 percent of the respondents in the Swiss
canton of Fribourg felt chronically ill [?]. However, at least the financial consequences of
chronic illness are largely covered by mandatory health insurance. Finally, unemployment
has always been below 4 percent since 2010 [?], and it is largely insured as well. Therefore,
one can state the following hypotheses with regard to the types of beneficiaries.
Hypothesis 1: Demand for redistribution is expected to be highest for families with
children, followed by the working poor. At some distance due to existing insurance coverage,
pensioners, people in ill health, and the unemployed are predicted to follow.
In addition, the insurance view of redistribution suggests a set of hypotheses concerning
the demand for redistribution by specific subsets of the population.
Hypothesis 2: Demand for redistribution in favor of old-age pensioners is expected to
be the highest for respondents near and beyond the retirement age.
Hypothesis 3: Demand for redistribution in favor of the unemployed is expected to be
higher for those who expect to become or stay unemployed.
Hypothesis 4: Demand for redistribution in favor of people in ill health is expected to
be higher for those who experience health problems themselves or have relatives with health
problems.
2.3 Recipients’ Nationality and Preferences for Redistribution
The behavioral explanations of redistribution emphasize imperfect altruism [Fong et al.
(2006)]. While perfect altruism is exclusively governed by recipients’ preferences, imperfect
altruism also reflects donor preferences. In particular, people as potential donors are
predicted to oppose public welfare if they believe that recipients take advantage of the
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system, a behavior that often is attributed to members of ethnic minorities.
In the case of Switzerland, ethnic minorities are the result of recent immigration. This
suggests distinguishing three major groups of recipients of public transfers according to
nationality: Swiss citizens, citizens of Western European states, and other citizens. The
predicted preference structure is as follows. The demand for redistribution in favor of one’s
own group is expected to be the highest. Western Europeans are next because they are
not over-represented among the poor, contrary to citizens from the Balkan states, Africa,
and South America who together account for the bulk of immigrants from the rest of the
world.
Hypothesis 5: Demand for redistribution in favor of Swiss citizens is expected to be
highest, followed by Western Europeans and by the rest of the world1.
3 Discrete Choice Experiments
3.1 Theoretical Foundations
Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs) provide a tool for measuring individuals’ prefer-
ences for characteristics of commodities, the so-called attributes. In contradistinction from
classical Revealed Preference Theory, originating with Samuelson (1938), DCEs allow in-
dividuals to express their preferences for non-marketed as well as hypothetical products.
During a DCE, respondents are repeatedly asked to compare the status quo with several
hypothetical alternatives defined by their attributes including price. By varying the levels
of attributes, different product alternatives are generated. A rational individual will always
choose the alternative with the highest utility. From the observed choices, the researcher
can infer the utility associated with the attributes. The proposed method, derived from
1Both imperfect altruism and the insurance view expounded in Section 2.2 lead to the prediction
that e.g. demand for redistribution in favor of immigrants from the rest of the world is highest among
respondents coming from the rest of the world. However, since 94 percent of the respondents are born in
the country (see Section 4.1), the pertinent subsample is too small to permit valid statistical inference.
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the New Demand Theory of Lancaster (1971), is also known as Conjoint Analysis [Louviere
et al. (2000)].
The most prominent alternative to a DCE is Contingent Valuation (CV). A certain
situation or product is described in detail and respondents are asked to indicate their max-
imum WTP for this fixed product. Only its price attribute is varied, while in Conjoint
Analysis all relevant attributes are varied simultaneously, making it a multi-attribute val-
uation method [Merino-Castello (2003)]. While a DCE describes the product in less detail
than a typical CV study, it allows for analyzing many product varieties by varying the lev-
els of relevant attributes [Louviere et al. (2000), p. 344]. Trade-offs among attributes can
be explicitly taken into account and WTP values of attributes estimated separately (see
below). Furthermore, strategic behavior of respondents is less likely than in CV with its
exclusive emphasis on price, which facilitates strategic behavior. Finally, biases that easily
occur when individuals are directly asked about their WTP are less frequently observed in
a DCE [Ryan (2004)].
A particular advantage of a DCE in the present context is that it permits to explicitly
impose the budget constraint through a price attribute in the guise of the tax share of
income used to finance the transfers considered. Respondents can be made to simultane-
ously choose this share and hence the ‘size of the pie’ and its ‘slices’ devoted to different
types of recipients (individuals in ill health, old age, etc.). Thus, trade-offs among different
attributes of the good ‘redistribution’ can be calculated to assess their relative importance.
The econometric method used is based on the Random Utility Theory [see Luce (1959),
Manski and Lerman (1977) and McFadden (1974, 1981, 2001)]. Thus, individual i values
alternative j according to the utility Vij attained, which is given by
Vij = vi(aj , pj, yi, si, εij). (1)
Here, vi(·) denotes i’s indirect utility function, aj , the amount of attributes associated with
alternative j, and pj, the price. The individual’s income and sociodemographic character-
istics are symbolized by yi and si, respectively. Finally, εij denotes the error term, which is
due to the fact that the experimenter never observes all arguments entering vi, imparting
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a stochastic element to observed choices. As usual, the utility function is additively split
into a systematic component w(·) and a stochastic one,
Vij = wi(aj , pj, yi, si) + εij.
Individual i will prefer alternative j to alternative l if and only if
wi(al, pl, yi, si) + εil ≤ wi(aj , pj, yi, si) + εij. (2)
Due to the presence of the stochastic term, only the probability Pij of individual i choosing
alternative j rather than alternative l can be estimated, with
Pij = Prob [wi(al, pl, yi, si) + εil ≤ wi(aj , pj, yi, si) + εij ] (3)
= Prob [εil − εij ≤ wi(aj , pj, yi, si)− wi(al, pl, yi, si)] . (4)
Thus, the probability of choosing j amounts to the probability of the systematic utility
difference wi[j] − wi[l] dominating the ’noise’, εil − εij. The error terms {εil, εij} can
be assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variances σ2l and σ
2
j as well
as covariance σlj . Under these assumptions, ϕij := εil − εij is also normally distributed
with mean zero and variance σ2 := Var[ϕij] = σ
2
l + σ
2
j − 2σlj . Thus, equation (4) can be
represented as
Pij = Φ
(
wi(aj , pj, yi, si)− wi(al, pl, yi, si)
σ
)
, (5)
where Φ(·) denotes the cdf of a standard normal distribution. This model is known as
the binary probit model, cf. Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985). Hensher et al. (1999) provide
empirical evidence that a linear specification of the function w(·) leads to good predictions
in its middle ranges. Therefore, one posits
wi(aj, pj, yi, si) = ci +
K∑
k=1
βkak + εij, (6)
where ci represents an individual-specific constant, ak, k = 1, . . . , K, are the attributes of
the alternative, and βk, k = 1, . . . , K, are the parameters to be estimated. These parame-
ters can be interpreted as the constant marginal utilities of the corresponding attributes.
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The marginal rate of substitution between two attributes m and n is given by
MRSm,n = −
∂v/∂am
∂v/∂an
. (7)
In the case of a linear utility function, this can be estimated as the ratio of the respective
slope parameters,
MRSm,n = −
βˆm
βˆn
,
representing the marginal WTP for an additional unit of am expressed in units of an.
Therefore, the marginal WTP for attribute am can be calculated by dividing the marginal
utility of this attribute by the marginal utility of the price attribute [in our context, the
income tax rate, see e.g. Telser (2002), p. 56]2:
MWTP(am) =
∂v/∂am
∂v/∂pj
. (8)
By limiting the specification to the product attributes only (simple model, cf. Section 5.1),
one obtains the following expression representing the difference in utility of individual i
between alternative j and the status quo l,
∆Vij = ci +
K∑
k=1
βk∆akj + βp∆pj + ϕij, (9)
where ∆ci = cij − cil, ∆akj = akj − akl, ∆pj = pj − pl, ϕij = εij − εil for each j 6= l.
For econometric inference, it is important to take into account that the same individual
makes several choices. A popular specification is the two-way random-effect, ϕij = µi+ηij ,
where µi denotes the component that varies only across individuals but not across the
choice alternatives. The terms µi and ηij are assumed uncorrelated with the product
attributes (ai1, . . . , aiK) and between themselves. By a standard assumption in a probit
2By Roy’s Identity, xij = −
∂v(·)/∂pj
∂v(·)/∂yi
. Therefore, the (uncompensated) demand of individual i for
commodity j corresponds to the negative ratio of partial derivatives of the indirect utility function with
respect to price pj and income yi. If one alternative is chosen, then the optimal quantity demanded is
equal to one, i.e. xij = 1. Therefore, Roy’s Identity yields
∂v
∂yi
= − ∂v
∂pj
, i.e. the marginal utility of income
is equal to the negative derivative of the indirect utility function with respect to the price.
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model, ση = 1. Hence Var[ϕij ] = σ
2
η + σ
2
µ = 1 + σ
2
µ and Corr[ϕij, ϕil] =
σ2µ
1+σ2µ
=: ρ. The
parameter ρ indicates how strongly the various responses are correlated with each other, or,
equivalently, the share of the total variance that can be explained by the individual-specific
error term. The random-effects specification is justified if ρ is high and significant.
The variance of the marginal WTP values can be computed using the delta method,
cf. Hole (2007).
3.2 Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted with a representative sample of 979 respondents in the fall
of 2008. Respondents were mailed full decision sets including graphical representations
of the status quo and alternatives and were asked to submit their binary choices during
a telephone survey. In order to make sure that decisions were based on a homogeneous
information set and made in a consistent way, the respondents additionally received a de-
tailed description of the attributes and their possible realizations. The Appendix shows the
graphical representation of the status quo (Exhibit 1) and two selected alternatives (Ex-
hibits 2 and 3). The telephone survey followed a few days later and additionally included
a questionnaire covering a wide range of socioeconomic and behavioral characteristics of
the respondents.
Prior to the experiment, the attributes and their levels used to define ‘income redistri-
bution’ had been checked in two pretests for their relevance. They form four groups (see
Table 1).
1. Shares of the total redistribution budget (to be spent on five groups of recipients,
viz. working poor, the unemployed, old-age pensioners, families with children, and
ill people);
2. Shares of the total redistribution budget (to be spent on three groups defined by, viz.
Swiss citizens, western european foreigners, and other foreigners);
3. Total amount of redistribution, defined as a share of GDP;
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Attribute Label Status Quo Level Alternative Levels
Shares of benefits going to
• Working Poor WP 10% 5%, 15%
• Unemployed UNEMP 15% 5%, 25%
• Old-Age Pensioners PENS 45% 35%, 55%
• Families with Children FAM 5% 10%
• People in ill health ILL 25% 20%, 30%
Shares of benefits going to
• Swiss citizens SWISS 75% 60%, 85%
• Western European foreigners WEU 10% 5%, 10%, 20%
• Other foreigners OTH 15% 10%, 15%, 20%
Total amount of redistribution REDIST 25% (of GDP) 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%
Income tax TAX 25% (of personal income) 10%, 15%, 40%
Table 1: Attributes and their levels
4. Share of personal income tax rate to be paid by the respondent (the price attribute).
Clearly, these attributes and their levels combine to form a total number of possible sce-
narios that cannot be realized in an experiment. The scenarios define the n rows of the
observation matrix X , with associated covariance matrix Ω = σ2 (X ′X)−1 of parameters
β to be estimated. So-called D-efficient design calls for the minimization of the geometric
mean of the eigenvalues of Ω,
D efficiency =
(
|Ω|
1
K
)
−1
where K denotes the number of parameters to be estimated [cf. Carlsson and Martinsson
(2003)]. Using this optimization procedure and incorporating several restrictions, the num-
ber of alternatives was reduced to 35 and randomly split in five groups. One alternative
was included twice in each decision set for a consistency test, resulting in 8 binary choices
per respondent.
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4 Descriptive Statistics
4.1 Socioeconomic Characteristics
Age groups N % of valid answers
18-35 264 27
36-59 435 44
60 and older 280 29
Total valid answers 979 100
Sample 979
Table 2: Respondents’ age
Unemployment expectation N % of valid answers
expect to be unemployed 97 10
do not expect 832 90
Total valid answers 929 100
Missing 50
Sample 979
Table 3: Expectation to become/stay unemployed within 2 years
Health status N % of valid answers
health problems 512 53
no health problems 458 47
Total valid answers 970 100
Missing 9
Sample 979
Table 4: Health status among family members
The sample consists of 979 respondents, 70 percent of them residing in the German-
speaking part and 30 percent in the French-speaking part of Switzerland. Some 94 percent
are born in the country, 50 percent are men, 20 percent having a monthly income below
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CHF 2,000 and 23 percent, above CHF 6,000, reflecting the structure of the Swiss popu-
lation. 27 percent are younger than 36 while 29 percent are at least 60 years of age (see
Table 2 for the age distribution).
Some 10 percent of respondents expect to become or to stay unemployed within the
next two years (see Table 3). Further, when asked about the health status of their families,
53 percent of respondents stated that they themselves or their family members experience
health problems (see Table 4).
In all, the structure of the sample permits a test of Hypotheses 1 to 4, which are
based on the view that income redistribution serves an insurance function. Depending
on its structure, it benefits especially the aged, the unemployed, and people in ill health,
thus inducing demand for redistribution among these groups. however, Hypothesis 5,
emphasizing imperfect altruism, can only be tested in a more cursory matter since the
share of foreign-born respondents is no more than 6 percent.
4.2 Respondents’ Choice Behavior
Choices N in percent
alternative 1,562 19.94
status quo 6,088 77.73
no decision 182 2.32
Total 7,832 100
Table 5: Total number of choices
There is a total of 979 · 8 = 7, 832 decisions, of which not quite 20 percent were made
in favor of an alternative over the status quo (see Table 5). This is a low percentage, for
which there are at least four explanations. First, in spite of checking in the pretests, the
levels of the attributes in the experiment may not have been sufficiently extreme to induce
respondents to switch. Second, some attributes (e.g. benefits going to the working poor;
see Table 7), may not have been sufficiently valued to cause a switch. Third, there may be
errors in decision making because the consistency test revealed 14 percent of choices to be
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# choices for alternative No. in percent
0 209 21.35
1 309 31.56
2 226 23.08
3 131 13.38
4 57 5.82
5 16 1.63
6 10 1.02
7 0 0.00
8 5 0.51
Total valid answers 965 98.57
Missing 14 1.43
Sample 979 100
Table 6: Distribution of the numbers of chosen alternatives per respondent
inconsistent. Finally, it may simply reflect a strong status quo bias in the face of a highly
complex decision-making situation (see the large negative constant in Table 7).
Still, only 21 percent of respondents never opted for an alternative (see Table 6). Con-
versely, almost 80 percent departed from the status quo at least once.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Relevance of Product Attributes and Testing of Hypotheses
1 and 5
Estimation of equation (9) calls for two adjustments in view of Table 1. First, let a
respondent allocate 15 percent of the redistributive budget to the working poor (WP),
while opting for 20 percent of the GDP being devoted to redistribution (REDIST). This
implies that the preferred share of GDP going to the working poor amounts to 3 percent
in this case. Let another respondent also allocate 15 percent of the total to WP but select
15
40 percent for REDIST. This time, the preferred share of the GDP in favor of WP is 6
percent. To reflect this difference, WP needs to be replaced by W˜P = WP · REDIST,
and similarly for the other shares of benefits listed in Table 1. The second adjustment is
that the two adding-up restrictions inherent in Table 1 need to be imposed,
W˜P+ ˜UNEMP+ I˜LL+ F˜AM + P˜ENS = REDIST (10)
C˜H+ W˜EU + O˜TH = REDIST. (11)
Since REDIST is an important attribute of its own, it needs to be included in the estima-
tion. This means that one of its components must be excluded from both equations (10)
and (11). The choice of exclusion restriction is arbitrary but might affect estimated WTP
values. This effect is analogous to an omitted variable bias, whose size varies with the
absolute value of the pertinent coefficient (Greene (2000), p. 334). Preliminary regressions
indicated that F˜AM has the highest coefficient, followed by W˜P, P˜ENS, ˜UNEMP, and
finally I˜LL. Similarly, C˜H was found to dominate W˜EU, which in turn dominated O˜TH.
This suggests the following regression strategy for implementing restriction (10). Start
with F˜AM, checking for omitted variable bias caused by excluding the less important at-
tributes one at a time. Next, turn to second-ranking W˜P without excluding F˜AM because
this would cause an unnecessary amount of bias. By the same token, it would make little
sense to exclude F˜AM and W˜P when focus is on P˜ENS, and similarly for ˜UNEMP. The
same strategy was applied to restriction (11). For example, the WTP estimates entered
on lines No. 1 and 12 of Table 7 are derived from the model
∆V˜ij = c0 + β1W˜Pj + β2 ˜UNEMPj + β3I˜LLj + β4F˜AMj +
+β5C˜Hj + β6W˜EUj +
+β7REDISTj + β8TAXj + ϕij .
Estimation results are displayed in Table 7. As was to be expected, the coefficient and
marginal effect of F˜AM is most strongly affected when second-ranking W˜P is excluded.
The preferred estimate appears on line No. 4, with I˜LL excluded. For W˜P, it is the one on
line No. 7, and for P˜ENS, line No. 9. With regard to recipient’s nationality, the estimate
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Variable Coeff. SE z P > |z| Marginal WTP,
effect % of inc.
Recipients’ Social Group
1. F˜AM if W˜P excluded 0.05374 0.02805 1.92 0.055 0.01370 2.61
2. F˜AM if P˜ENS excluded 0.07942 0.02660 2.99 0.003 0.02025 3.86
3. F˜AM if ˜UNEMP excluded 0.09795 0.02751 3.56 0.000 0.02498 4.75
4. F˜AM if I˜LL excluded 0.15181 0.02975 5.10 0.000 0.03871 7.37
5. W˜P if P˜ENS excluded 0.02569 0.01708 1.50 0.133 0.00655 1.25
6. W˜P if ˜UNEMP excluded 0.04421 0.01740 2.54 0.011 0.01127 2.15
7. W˜P if I˜LL excluded 0.09808 0.02398 4.09 0.000 0.02501 4.76
8. P˜ENS if ˜UNEMP excluded 0.01853 0.00818 2.27 0.023 0.00472 0.90
9. P˜ENS if I˜LL excluded 0.07239 0.01693 4.28 0.000 0.01846 3.51
10. ˜UNEMP if I˜LL excluded 0.05387 0.01759 3.06 0.002 0.01374 2.61
Recipient’s Nationality
11. C˜H if W˜EU excluded 0.01494 0.01420 1.05 0.293 0.00381 0.73
12. C˜H if O˜TH excluded 0.10146 0.01819 5.58 0.000 0.02587 4.93
13. W˜EU if O˜TH excluded 0.08652 0.02682 3.23 0.001 0.02206 4.20
TAX (for any specification) -0.02060 0.00180 -11.42 0.000 -0.00525 –
Constant (for any specification) -0.92929 0.02969 -31.30 0.000 - -45.11
Note: Bold entries show preferred specifications.
Table 7: Summary of random effects probit estimates for different model specifications.
with smaller bias presumably is on line No. 12 rather than 11. However, regardless of
the exclusion restriction imposed, a higher share of the GDP devoted to any of the types
of beneficiaries and nationalities has positive utility, while the price attribute (TAX) is
negatively valued. Finally, the negative constant points to status quo bias.
Based on the preferred specification (in bold in Table 7), Hypothesis 1 receives a consid-
erable measure of confirmation. Among the beneficiaries that cannot count on insurance,
families with children rank first, followed by the working poor as predicted. As to the
beneficiaries enjoying insurance protection, pensioners precede the unemployed, again as
predicted. Contrary to the hypothesis, however, WTP for people in ill health is lowest of
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all, causing them to be defined as the residual category (see above).
Hypothesis 5 is derived from behavioral rather than insurance theory. However, since
it also related to the population at large, it is examined next. The preferred specifications
(corresponding to lines 11 and 12 of Table 7) indicate that WTP for redistribution is
in favor of Swiss citizens, followed by Western European nationals and to the detriment
of other nationalities (which was dominated, thus forming the residual category). This
constitutes a partial confirmation of Hypothesis 5, which had predicted a clear preference
for redistribution benefiting Swiss nationals over one benefiting Western Europeans.
In favor of to the detriment of WTP in % of income WTP in CHF SE in CHF
1. FAM WP 2.61 120.40 75.59
2. FAM PENS 3.86 177.94 71.82
3. FAM UNEMP 4.75 219.45 75.89
4. FAM ILL 7.37 340.13 83.55
5. WP PENS 1.25 57.55 45.64
6. WP UNEMP 2.15 99.05 47.54
7. WP ILL 4.76 219.73 66.34
8. PENS UNEMP 0.90 41.50 22.87
9. PENS ILL 3.51 162.19 47.76
10. UNEMP ILL 2.61 120.68 47.53
11. CH WEU 0.73 33.47 37.97
12. CH OTH 4.93 227.31 54.61
13. WEU OTH 4.20 193.83 75.52
Constant -45.11 -2081.99 223.36
Note: Bold entries show preferred specifications.
Table 8: Mean marginal WTP values for reallocation of redistributive budget between two
groups of beneficiaries (in % of monthly disposable income and CHF, 1 CHF = 0.88 $ in
December 2008)
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5.2 Extended Models: Testing for Hypotheses 2 to 4
Hypotheses 2 to 4 of Section 2.3 make predictions regarding differences in WTP values
between segments of the population. The covariates of interest are age, expectations about
unemployment, and family health status.
In order to estimate ceteris paribus effects, the attributes listed in Table 1 are interacted
e.g. with AGE60+, a dummy variable indicating that the respondent is at least 60 years
old. This gives rise to a first of four sets of interaction terms extending equation.
5.2.1 Extended Model 1: Age and Demand for Old-Age Pensions vs Family
Support (Hypothesis 2)
in favor of to the detriment of WTP in % of income WTP in CHF SE in CHF
(A) FAM PENS 5.13 231.89 83.80
(B) WP PENS 0.47 21.05 62.35
(C) PENS UNEMP 0.64 28.79 28.71
(D) PENS ILL 3.35 151.49 49.95
Table 9: Marginal WTP values for attributes (in % of monthly disposable average income
and CHF, 1 CHF = 0.88 $ in December 2008) derived for the age group 60 and older
Reestimation of equation (13) with all the attributes in linear and interacted form
(using AGE60+), imposing exclusion No. 1 in Table 7, and using eq. (8) results in the
WTP values displayed in Table 9 (entries A, B, C, D correspond to entries 2, 5, 8, 9 in
Table 8). Among respondents aged 60 or more, WTP for reallocating 1 percent of GDP
to families to the detriment of pensioners amounts to 5.13 percent of the average monthly
income in the sample. This is even higher than the 3.86 percent across all groups (see line
No. 2 of Table 8). This is a contradiction of Hypothesis 2, stating that the demand for
redistribution favoring old-age pensioners is expected to be particularly high in the group
aged 60 and more. In turn, the WTP for a reallocation of 1 percent of GDP to the working
poor is lower in this group (0.47 percent compared to 1.25 percent of income in line No. 5
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of Table 8), but statistical significance is missing. In the two cases where pensioners stand
to benefit, WTP values in Table 9 are again below those of Table 8, lines No. 8 and 9. On
the whole, Hypothesis 2 has to be rejected.
5.2.2 Extended Model 2: Employment Expectations and Demand for Unem-
ployment Support (Hypothesis 3)
in favor of to the detriment of WTP in % of income WTP in CHF SE in CHF
(E) WP UNEMP 5.34 264.80 118.86
(F) PENS UNEMP 1.02 50.73 45.27
(G) FAM UNEMP -4.12 -204.32 157.61
(H) UNEMP ILL -0.88 -43.73 91.43
Table 10: Marginal WTP values for attributes (in % of monthly disposable average income)
derived for the respondents who expect to be unemployed during the next two years
This time, equation (13) is complemented with all attributes interacted with the dummy
variable UEXP , indicating that the respondent expects to become or remain unemployed
during the next two years. This extended model allows us to test Hypothesis 3, stating that
the demand for unemployment support is higher for respondents with expectations to lose
their job or to remain unemployed. Here, we observe two statistically significant differences
in preferences between respondents with these expectations and others (entries E, F, G,
H in Table 10 correspond to entries 6, 8, 3, 10 in Table 8, respectively). The marginal
WTP for a reallocation of 1 percent of GDP from the unemployed to families with children
exhibited by this group (line G) is significantly lower than for the general population (line
3) and even attains a negative value of -4.12 percent of monthly income, thus supporting
the hypothesis. However, when it comes to the question of whether the social budget
should more strongly benefit the unemployed to the detriment of people with ill health
(line H), those who expect to be unemployed surprisingly resist this as well, exhibiting a
marginal WTP of -0.88 compared to +2.61 percentage points of monthly disposable income
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in the general population (line 10 of Table 8). Thus, Hypothesis 3 cannot be accepted in
its entirety.
5.2.3 Extended Model 3: Health Status and Demand for Support of People
with Ill Health (Hypothesis 4)
in favor of to the detriment of WTP in % of income WTP in CHF SE in CHF
(I) WP ILL 4.41 202.93 65.62
(K) UNEMP ILL 3.09 142.11 43.57
(L) PENS ILL 3.57 164.60 42.22
(M) FAM ILL 6.51 299.79 82.67
Table 11: Marginal WTP values for attributes (in % of monthly disposable average income)
derived for the respondents who experience health problems among their relatives
Finally, we consider an extension of the basic model by including the dummy variable
ILLFAM for the health status of respondents’ family members and themselves. Hypoth-
esis 4 stated that willingness to pay for redistribution in favor of people in ill health is
expected to be higher among those who experience health problems among their close
relatives or themselves. However, our results (see Table 11 with entries I, K, L, M corre-
sponding to entries 7, 10, 9, 4 of Table 8) suggest that family health status does not have
an impact on preferences for the composition of the redistribution portfolio. For example,
those with health problems have a WTP of 4.4 percent of average income for redistribut-
ing income in favor of the working poor to the detriment of people with ill health (line I),
no different from the 4.76 percent in the general population (line 7 of Table 8). The ‘no
difference’ finding holds true for the other three ways to distribute income away from the
unemployed (lines K, L, M of table 11 compared to lines 10, 9, 4 of Table 8). Therefore,
Hypothesis 4 cannot be confirmed.
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6 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we elicited citizens’ willingness to pay (WTP) for the composition of the
public redistributive budget through a Discrete Choice experiment performed in 2008. The
theoretical background is provided by the insurance motivation for income redistribution
(Hypotheses 1 to 4) and imperfect altruism as a motivation (Hypothesis 5). Hypothesis 1
predicts that WTP for redistribution is high if beneficiaries are exposed to major risks that
are not insured, namely to have children and to belong to the working poor. Beneficiaries
facing a risk that is mitigated by mandatory insurance (illness, unemployment, old age)
are predicted to trigger lower WTP. Since this ranking is confirmed with one exception,
Hypothesis 1 receives a good deal of empirical support.
Hypothesis 2, predicting the demand for redistribution favoring old-age pensioners to
be highest among those close to or beyond retirement age, has to be rejected. Hypothesis 3,
stating that the demand for unemployment support is higher for respondents expecting to
be unemployed, can be only confirmed with respect to the trade-off between the unemployed
and families with children. Hypothesis 4, stating that WTP for redistribution in favor of
people with ill health is expected to be higher among those who experience health problems
among their close relatives, cannot be confirmed due to a lack of statistical significance.
On the whole, the insurance motive as an explanation of the demand for income redis-
tribution receives limited empirical support in this study. This is the more remarkable as
the design of the Discrete Choice experiment permits respondents to express their prefer-
ences not only concerning the total amount of redistribution but also with regard to the
allocation of the available funds to competing uses. It is in this second context where the
insurance motive should become important in principle because individuals can predict to
some extent the allocation that may be in their interest in the future. The failure to find
the predicted effects points to other motives for income redistribution, in particular ‘pure’
altruism among the aged on favor of younger segments of the population who bear the
burden of raising a family while facing the risks of becoming a working poor and someone
in ill health. That altruism, at least of the ‘imperfect’ variety, may be at work is indicated
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by the fact that there is WTP for redistribution in favor of migrants to Switzerland, a
group current residents are extremely unlikely to belong in the future. Indeed, hypothesis
5, stating that the WTP for redistribution in favor of Swiss citizens is expected to be the
highest, followed by citizens of Western European countries and others, is partially con-
firmed. WTP in favor of the two first groups dominates that in favor of recipients from
other parts of the world but without the predicted difference in favor of Swiss nationals.
In sum, the view of income redistribution as a way of providing insurance against a
miserable life at the bottom of the income distribution receives empirical support from
this experiment only to the extent that WTP for it broadly reflects the degree to which
recipients are exposed to risks not covered by social insurance. The more restrictive vari-
ant of this insurance view, relating types of beneficiaries (e.g. pensioners) to current states
of respondent (e.g. age above 60) has to be rejected. However, the finding that Swiss
preferences for redistribution are tilted against migrants from culturally distant countries
suggests an important role for imperfect altruism. It would be worthwhile to explore the
precise role of this type of altruism in future work. While perfect altruism does not put
constraints on how to slice the pie in public redistribution policy, imperfect altruism con-
ditions citizens’ support of policy on the perceived cultural distance between its financiers
and its beneficiaries. Policy makers would therefore be well advised to pattern programs
designed to modify the distribution of income to the discussions of cultural distance of
relevance in their country.
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A Appendix
Exhibit 1: Status Quo Card (current state of redistribution)
    Tax Rate              Amount of Redistribution
25% of your 
income 25% of GDP
 Use of Redistribution  Nationality of Beneficiaries  
         
            
citizens of 
Western
European
states
10% 
citizens of other 
states
15%
Swiss
citizens
75%
old-age
pensioners 
45%
families 
with
children 5% 
people
with ill 
health
25%
unemployed
15%
working
poor  10% 
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Exhibit 2: Card for Alternative No. 1
        Tax Rate  Amount of Redistribution
   Uses of Redistribution             Nationality of Beneficiaries
                                                                            
  Swiss 
citizens
60%
citizens of 
Western European 
states
20%
citizens of 
other states 
          20% 
old-age
pensioners 
      55%
working
poor 15% 
families 
with
children
5%
people with 
ill health 
       20%
25% of your 
income
20% of GDP 
unemployed 
5%
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Exhibit 3: Card for Alternative No. 2
    Tax Rate   Amount of Redistribution
15% of your 
income 10% of GDP
    Uses of Redistribution            Nationality of Beneficiaries
                                                                                         
Swiss citizens 
75%
citizens of 
Western
European states 
10% 
citizens of 
other states 
            15% 
old-age
pensioners 
45%
people
with ill 
health
30%
unemployed 
15%
working
poor
5%
families with 
children 5% 
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